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MARY JO GERBER
Defendant/Appellee.

—000OOO000—

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A3(2)(I) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Does Plaintiff/Appellant Lowell Gerber's ("Dr. Gerber") failure to properly

marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's factual findings preclude this Court's
review of those findings and the trial court's legal conclusions based on those findings?
This Court has articulated the following standard for appellants challenging
factual findings of a trial court:
In challenging the trial court's Findings, Dr. Gerber:
must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts as found by
the trial court and then demonstrate that even reviewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact. If the
Appellant fails to marshall the evidence, the appellate court
a s s u m e s the record supports the findings of the trial court
and proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case.
Saunders v.Sharp. 806P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). Peterson v. Peterson.
818P.2d 1305,1308 (UtahApp. 1991).
2.

Did the trial court properly award alimony to Defendant/Appellee Mary Jo

Gerber ("Ms. Gerber") pursuant to the parties' stipulation which was incorporated in the
final Decree of Divorce? To the extent that the trial court's ruling can b e considered an
initial award of alimony a s reserved under the parties' agreed language in p a r a g r a p h
three of the Decree of Divorce, the appropriate standard of review on a p p e a l is that:
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony... and will b e upheld
on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell
v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (UtahApp. 1991), cert, denied 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
"Further, [this Court] review[s] a trial court's conclusion of law with respect to alimony
awards for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." Id. "If, however, [this
Court is] charged with the task of reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, [the Court]
will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous." Id*: see also Breinholt v. Breinholt,
905 P.2d 877, 879 (UtahApp. 1995).
3.

Did the trial court properly determine that there had been no material

change in circumstances of the parties since the entry of the parties' Decree of Divorce
which would justify a drastic modification or termination of the parties' a g r e e d upon

2

alimony award? To the extent that Dr. Gerber challenges the factual finding of the trial
court that there has not been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the
parties7 Divorce Decree, the appropriate standard of review is: "The determination of the
trial court that there [has or has not] been a substantial change of circumstances . . . is
presumed valid." Mitchell v. Mitchell 527P.2d 1359, 1361 (Utah 1974). "Therefore, [the
Court] review[s] the trial court's ruling of no substantial change of circumstances for an
abuse of discretion." Id; see also Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (UtahApp. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
There is no specific constitutional or statutory provision, ordinance, rule or
regulation which is determinative of the issues presented in this appeal. Ms. Gerber's
position is supported by the case authorities presented in this brief summarized in the
table of cases, page iii, supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action began when Dr. Gerber filed for divorce on December 29, 1992. The
matter came before the trial court for pretrial settlement conference on June 23, 1993 at
which time the parties advised the court they had settled the case (Record 70-71). The
parties' agreement included alimony of $4,000.00 per month to Ms. Gerber commencing
in July, 1993. This figure was based on the incomes shown on the parties' Financial
Declarations and the fact that Ms. Gerber was suffering from a broken wrist which the
parties agreed limited her earning ability. The parties further agreed that the alimony
amount would be reviewed in one year and that Ms. Gerber would use her best efforts
to seek employment and to rehabilitate herself from her injury.
3

The parties specifically reserved the issue of whether Ms. Gerber should seek fulltime or part-time employment based on Ms. Gerber's concern that she be available to
care for the parties' children (Record 70, 71). The stipulated Decree of Divorce was
thereafter entered on November 26, 1993. As part of that Decree, the parties divided their
property with each receiving property valued at $512,118.00; Ms. Gerber received the
equity in the marital home and Dr. Gerber received that much more of the retirement
accounts (Record 77-78).
On February 24, 1994, Dr. Gerber filed a Petition to Modify the Decree, alleging that
he was entitled to have Ms. Gerber's alimony reviewed under paragraph 3 of the Decree
because Ms. Gerber had allegedly not taken the actions necessary to rehabilitate herself
and was voluntarily continuing her disability. Dr. Gerber further asserted that his then
current monthly income of $16,666.67 was insufficient to meet his living needs (Record
87-89). Ms. Gerber resisted the Petition and asserted that it was not made in good faith
and requested that her attorney's fees and costs be awarded to her (Record 91-92).
The Petition came before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding in place of
Judge Richard H. Moffat, who was physically unable to preside over the trial on November
15, 1994. After hearing the testimony and considering the exhibits offered by the parties,
Judge Cornaby found there had been no substantial change of circumstances which
would justify reducing Ms. Gerber's alimony. In making that finding, he focused in part
on the parties' agreed language of the Decree which provided:
The issue is reserved as to whether defendant's employment should be full
or part-time based upon the needs of the children. At the time of the review,
each party should have the right to express her or his respective positions
4

on this issue, as the plaintiff's position is that the defendant should seek and
obtain full-time employment, and the defendant's position is that she should
seek and obtain part-time employment due to the children's needs.
(Record 444) (emphasis added).
Judge Cornaby ruled that the parties had the financial ability to allow Ms. Gerber
to function as a mother for the children for a substantial period of time and work only part
time. He therefore denied Dr. Gerber's Petition. However, the court did order that the
alimony amount Ms. Gerber would receive should remain at $4,000.00 a month until
December 1, 1995, when it will be reduced by $500.00 to $3,500.00 per month, and then
a year later, December 1, 1996, be reduced by an additional $500.00 to $3,000.00 per
month where it would remain (Record 444-450, 452). Further, the court found there was
no economic change of circumstances which would justify Dr. Gerber's request that there
be an immediate drastic reduction or termination of alimony.
Judge Cornaby's ruling was thereafter formalized in proposed Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law which were executed on June 16, 1995 and entered on June 20,
1995 (Record 151, 162). The Order of the court overruling Dr. Gerber's objections to the
proposed Findings and his Motion for a New trial was denied those same dates (Record
163, 165). In deciding Dr. Gerber's Motion, the court issued a formal, written ruling
June 16, 1995 that was entered June 20, 1995 (Record 148-149). In addition to denying Dr.
Gerber's motion, the court awarded Ms. Gerber a reasonable attorney fee for defending
against that motion. This modified the original ruling of the court that no attorney's fees
would be awarded after Dr. Gerber advised Ms. Gerber that he was going to keep her
in court until he had forced her to use up all of the $500,000.00 that had been "given" to
5

her at the time of the Decree (Record 133-135). The trial court awarded Ms. Gerber
attorneys fees in the amount of $892.00 on October 4, 1995 (Record 187-188).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After hearing all the evidence and reviewing the exhibits presented by the parties,
the court m a d e the following Findings of Fact:
3.
The plaintiff in his Financial Declaration of June of 1993 declared he
had a n income of $16,666.67 per month. In his Financial Declaration of
August, 1994, he declared income of $16,669.23 per month (Record 153);
4.
At the time the plaintiff submitted his Financial Declaration in June of
1993, he had already moved from Utah to Florida, established a residence,
entered into practice and declared monthly living expenses of $6,344.00 per
month. At the time he filed his August, 1994 Financial Declaration, the
plaintiff claimed living expenses of $6,370.00 per month, which when tested
in cross-examination, he admitted he was not fully expending (Record 153);
5.
Considering the Financial Declaration submitted by the plaintiff in
June of 1993, upon which the settlement of the matters reached by the
parties were m a d e and that submitted in August of 1994, a s well a s his
testimony of November 15, 1994, the court finds no substantial change in the
financial status or circumstances of the plaintiff between the date of the
agreement of the parties, the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the trial of
this matter on November 15, 1994 (Record 153);
6.
The defendant submitted a Financial Declaration in June of 1993,
stating she had no income and filed a Financial Declaration in August of
1994, declaring an income of $244.41 per month from substitute teaching.
This, she testified, had increased to $300.00 per month at the time of trial
(Record 153);
7.
In June of 1993 the plaintiff claimed living expenses of $7,017.00 per
month for herself and the minor children of the parties. In August of 1994,
the defendant claimed living expenses of $5,817.00 per month for herself
a n d the minor children with reservations of several anticipated capital
expenditures (Record 153-154);
8.
The court finds no substantial change in the financial status or
circumstances of the defendant between the time of the agreement of the
6

parties and the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the trial of this matter on
November 15, 1994 (Record 154);
9.
The court determines that there was and has been no substantial
change in the financial circumstances of the parties which would justify a
modification of a Decree of Divorce between the time of the entry of their
Agreement in June of 1993 and the trial of this matter in November of 1994
(Record 154); and
10.
The court finds that the issue which it heard on November 15, 1994
was the reserved issue under paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and
paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce which was whether or not the
defendant's employment should be full time or part time based upon the
needs of the children, and the position of each in this regard, was
specifically reserved for trial, which the court heard and now determines
(Record 154);
11.
The court finds that the parties entered into an Agreement and the
plaintiff agreed at that time that based upon his earnings, he had the ability
to pay the defendant $4,000.00 per month as alimony and the defendant
had a need for $4,000.00 per month as alimony and had no income at that
time from which to contribute to her own support and while defendant
claimed she needed a greater sum than $4,000.00 per month in order to
maintain the standard of living that she had enjoyed during the course of
the marriage, she accepted that sum as a compromise of those claims in
the belief that she could maintain an appropriate standard of living
accepting that sum (Record 154).
12.
The parties are in conflict with the plaintiff desiring his children to
obtain religious instruction and participate in swimming, and other sport
activities. It takes transportation and parental direction for those goals to
be achieved. They do not just happen. Children are motivated largely by
parents who are at home, not by a neighbor who picks them up and takes
them some place. In order to have the children pursue their religious and
sports activities, it is necessary that the defendant be involved with them in
doing so. Consequently, while the plaintiff desires the defendant to work
full time, he also wants her to provide the direction, support, and
transportation the children need for their religious and sports training and
activities. Practically speaking, if the defendant is working full time and
keeping up a household, she does not have the time to provide
transportation and support for the children in the religious and sports
activities the plaintiff wishes the children to pursue (Record 155);

7

13.
Plaintiff desires the defendant to work full time as a dental hygienist
and represents to the court that she could earn $4,000.00 per month if she
were doing so. The defendant does not disagree with the potential
earnings asserted by the plaintiff but has pointed out to the court that she
must work for a dentist and work the hours the dentist dictate that she work
if she works as a dental hygienist. If she does this she will not be able to
provide the transportation and support required by the children to carry out
their religious training, sports and activities (Record 155);
14.
The defendant cannot be both a full time dental hygienist and look
after the children and provide the support for their children in their religious
and sports training as both plaintiff and defendant want her to do. The
court heard testimony from physicians offered by each party as to whether
or not the defendant will require surgery to be able to function as dental
hygienist. It is the defendant's position that she could function as a dental
hygienist if she could practice and get tactile sensitivity restored to her
injured wrist. Surgery will not affect the tactility problem that exists.
Surgery may increase her mobility, but it will not affect her ability to feel
which she testified is necessary if she is to function as a dental hygienist
(Record 155-156);
15.
The court finds that the defendant excelled in the dental hygienist
examination in those portions of the test that were written, achieving a
perfect score. She failed those portions that were practical because she
did not have the tactile ability to function as required in order to be a dental
hygienist. The defendant testified she did not know of any program where
she could practice working with patients which is necessary in order to get
her tactile functioning restored if it is possible to do so. A program might
be available to do this, but it appears to the court that the real issue is what
are the needs of the children and measure this against the fiscal
requirements to maintain the standard of living established in the Decree.
This issue was specifically reserved in the Findings of Fact and Decree
effecting the agreement of the parties (Record 156);
16.
The defendant is employed as a substitute school teacher and she
has been able to work on a consistent basis those hours where her children
are in school and this work is the most the defendant is going to be able to
undertake and provide the religious and sports training support and
transportation that she has provided to the children during the marriage of
the parties and since the entry of the Decree. The defendant would not be
able to secure similar hours as a dental hygienist because a dentist's hours
do not coincide with school hours as do those of the substitute teaching in
which the defendant has been engaging. The defendant transports the
8

children to their religious training, their swimming, their ball games,
scouting and all of the various activities in which they are involved. This
does not give her freedom to work more than she is already working. She
is working 32 hours per week, and that is what the court finds that she could
work and provide for the children as she has (Record 156-157);
17.
The court finds from hearing the testimony of the plaintiff and the
defendant, and considering the positions taken by them in their pleadings,
that the plaintiff requests this court to choose to sacrifice the children and
ore. r the defendant to work. The defendant has chosen not to sacrifice the
interests of the children, but to put them in a paramount position and to
work on a secondary basis, and in working 32 hours per week, is working
all that she can work and still provide the support to the children that they
need to continue with their activities (Record 157); and
18.
The court has determined that the defendant could earn $25.00 per
hour instead of $5.90 if she were working as a dental hygienist rather than
as a substitute teacher, but to do so would require her to not provide the
parental support to the minor children of the parties that both plaintiff and
defendant desire her to provide. If she does not increase her earnings
above their present level, she will over the course of the court's Order as is
hereinafter provided, decrease her income by $1,000.00 per month in order
to provide that assistance to her children (Record 157).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. DR. GERBER HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT HIS APPEAL.
This Court requires an appellant challenging factual findings to marshall all the
evidence which supports those findings and demonstrate why that evidence when viewed
in a light most favorable to the findings does not support those findings. Saunders, 806
P.2d at 199; Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305. Dr. Gerber's brief contains no discussion
whatsoever, let alone a challenge to, or marshaling of, the evidence which supports the
trial court's Findings of Fact numbers 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18 where the court made
9

the factual finding that Ms. Gerber was acting appropriately in serving as an involved
parent who worked part time and was extensively involved with the childrens' lives. By
failing to properly address these findings, this Court should refuse to review the challenge
to these findings and the conclusions of law the trial court made based on these facts.
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY AWARDED ALIMONY
TO MS. GERBER BASED ON THE PARTIES' AGREED LANGUAGE
IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
The parties agreed to the inclusion of the following language in their Decree of
Divorce:
The issue is reserved as to whether defendant's employment should be full
or part-time based upon the needs of the children. At the time of the review,
each party shall have the right to express his or her respective positions on
this issue, as plaintiff's position is that the defendant should seek and obtain
full-time employment and the defendant's position is that she should seek
and obtain part-time employment due to the children's needs. (Record 76).
Ms. Gerber presented her position as to the needs of the children in terms of the
childrens' school, sports, religious training and social activities. She also presented
evidence that she could work part time as a substitute teacher, have hours that matched
her childrens', and meet both the childrens' needs and her commitment to provide
income to the family. The trial court, after hearing the testimony of the parties on this
question, ruled that Dr. Gerber should pay the agreed amount of alimony at the rate of
$4,000.00 per month with a gradual reduction in that amount to $3,000.00 per month and
then continue at that rate. The court heard and determined that Dr. Gerber's income
had not changed from prior to the entry of the Decree nor had Dr. Gerber's living
expenses changed sufficiently to justify a further change in Ms. Gerber's alimony.
10

The court heard Ms. Gerber's testimony concerning her living standards and her
ability to provide income for herself in light of the parties' agreement that she should
continue to provide for the needs of the children. Noting that Dr. Gerber retained
$10,500.00 per month of his salary while $6,100.00 thereof was transmitted to Ms. Gerber
and the parties' children and after the effective date of the declines Dr. Gerber would
retain $11,500.00 of his earnings (until the child support terminated) at which time he will
be retaining $13,666.00 of his monthly income and transmitting $3,000.00 of his monthly
income as alimony, the trial court concluded that there was no justification for changing
the alimony amount. The court appropriately considered the needs of Ms. Gerber, less
her ability to provide support for herself, and Dr. Gerber's ability to pay, keeping in mind
the goal of permitting the parties to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living
enjoyed by the parties during their marriage and the needs of the parties' children.
There simply was no error in the trial court's conclusion.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDING
THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING A MODIFICATION
OF THE DECREE IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD.
The trial court correctly made the factual finding that there had been no change
in Dr. Gerber's income and no real change in the living expenses of either of the parties
which would justify an immediate change in Ms. Gerber's alimony. As Judge Cornaby
stated on the record:
Now, so far as the parties and the standard of living to be maintained, let
me just say that I think as I have gone through these extensive documents
that have been given to the court that the plaintiff is really not in need of
11

having it reduced. There is no question that he has a desire to have it
reduced. There's no question that he spent a lot more money and has
maintained a lifestyle or even changed a lifestyle that's required more
money, but I think that's all voluntary choice.
By the same token, the defendant really has no great new needs or - we
do have her salary increase of $755.00, or whatever it is, per month which
adds to her income which was anticipated.
Yes, so, if you want to talk about what needs are, I think there is --1 would
look at those needs of both parties and say, "Yeah, there's inflation in both
of those that are not needs in a technical sense, that there is needs in the
sense that you want to maintain that standard of living that you've always
had. And even though you've got much more money than most cases talk
about when they come before the Court, you both still got lots of things that
you could cut out if you chose to." You are just not being forced to, I guess,
only by your own income and needs.
(Record 452-453). As noted by the trial court, Dr. Gerber simply presented insufficient
evidence to justify an immediate change in the amount of alimony. This Court should
affirm the trial court's decision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DR. GERBER'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
PRECLUDES THIS COURT'S REVIEW.
This Court has articulated the following test for appellants challenging factual
findings of a trial court:
In challenging the trial court's factual Findings, Dr. Gerber:
must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts as found by
the trial court and then demonstrate that even reviewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact. If the
Appellant fails to marshall the evidence, the appellate court
12

assumes the record supports the findings of the trial court
and proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case.
Saunders. 806 P.2d at 199 (citations omitted), Peterson, 818 P.2d at 1308. An examination
of Dr. Gerber's brief demonstrates that none of the trial court's findings of fact are
properly challenged. While the Court is cited to portions of the Record that Dr. Gerber
believes supports his challenge, no effort is made to show all of the relevant facts
presented to the trial court, much less is there an attempt to properly challenge any of the
factual findings of the court. Dr. Gerber simply states that the court erred in its exercise
of its discretion without marshaling all the evidence which supported that decision.
The marshaling rule was adopted so that there would be an understanding by both
the appellee and this Court as to what evidence exists in support of a ruling by the trial
court. This is required so that this Court is not put in the position of simply retrying the
case without seeing or hearing the witnesses. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in a
similar case, Nilson v. Nilson:
this court is reluctant to reconsider evidence that a trial court is in an
advantaged position to weigh. Our removal from the participants in a trial
puts us in the disadvantaged position of reviewing testimony from a cold
record. On review, we cannot judge the intonation of voice, or the manner
and demeanor of witnesses as the trial judge is able to do.
652 P.2d 1323, 1324-1324 (Utah 1982).1
1

See also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App. 1994):
Callahan does not properly attack the findings of the trial court on that
issue. He attempts to draw our attention to the testimony of witnesses,
which tends to be contrary to the findings, and he conveniently ignores the
testimony of witnesses that support the findings. Callahan ignores his
affirmative duty to properly attack the findings by marshaling the evidence.
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Dr. Gerber has simply attempted to retry and re-argue the matter to this Court by
claiming that the trial court's decision was somehow "unfair". He ignores Ms. Gerber's
role as child care provider as well as the fact that he specifically agreed to have the issue
of alimony reviewed within a year. Now, after that review, he wants this Court to ignore
the trial court's position as the finder of fact and review the evidence presented in that
review without following the Court's explicit marshaling mandate.
Rather than marshaling the evidence that supported the trial court's conclusion,
he has downplayed it or made it difficult to find. By arguing the evidence that was not
accepted by the trial court, he asks this Court to reject the findings of the trial court
without marshaling the evidence which supports those findings. This is a procedure
which this Court has unequivocally ruled is inappropriate. By taking this course, Dr.
Gerber has failed to properly present his appeal and this Court should "assume [] that the
record supports the findings of the trial court . . ." Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of
Transportation. 876 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah App. 1994) and based thereon, that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in its ruling.

Because of Callahan's failure to marshall the evidence, we assume the
record supports the findings of the trial court.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY AWARDED ALIMONY
TO MS. GERBER IN LIGHT OF THE ABILITY OF DR. GERBER
TO PAY, THE NEED OF MS. GERBER TO MAINTAIN
THE STANDARD OF LIVING ENJOYED BY
THE PARTIES DURING THE MARRIAGE AND
MS. GERBER'S ABILITY TO EARN INCOME.
Even if the Court were to ignore Dr. Gerber's failure to properly marshall the
evidence in support of the trial court's decision, a review of the relevant facts
demonstrates that the trial court did not err in its factual findings or in its legal conclusion
that the amount of alimony should not immediately drastically change or terminate. On
June 23, 1993, the parties stipulated that Dr. Gerber was to pay $4,000.00 per month as
alimony to Ms. Gerber. They specifically reserved the issue as to whether or not the
alimony should be based on a full-time or part-time employment based on the needs of
the children and the physical disability which Ms. Gerber was suffering at the time of the
entry of the making of the agreement. 2 When that question came back before the court
2

While Dr. Gerber only focuses on a portion of the stipulation, the relevant portion
provides in whole:
Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the sum of $4,000 a month
commencing with the month of July, 1993, based upon the current financial
circumstances of the parties as shown in their Financial Declarations and
under circumstances where defendant is currently unable to work based
upon her present physical disability.
There shall be an automatic review of this alimony award in one year from
the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, or earlier if circumstances
warrant, based upon the anticipation that defendant will use her best efforts
to seek and obtain employment at the highest economic level and will,
further, use her best efforts to rehabilitate herself from her disability to help
her achieve her best employment opportunities.
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for trial on November 15, 1994, the court found there had been no substantial change in
the financial circumstances of the party which would justify a drastic reduction or
termination of alimony. Dr. Gerber was earing the same amount of income that he had
been earning at the time he entered the agreement and the parties had living expenses
that were basically unchanged. 3
In Finding of Fact number 18 (Record 157), the court determined Ms. Gerber's
income earning ability and her ability to meet her needs without alimony. In making its
order regarding alimony, the trial court carried out the directions of this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court. As the rule has been articulated:
It is well established that the "function of alimony is to provide support for
the [receiving spouse] as nearly as possible at the standard of living [he or]

The issue is reserved as to whether defendant's employment should be full
or part-time based upon the needs of the children. At the time of the review,
each party shall have the right to express his or her respective position on
this issue, as plaintiff's position is that defendant should seek and obtain
full-time employment and defendant's position is that she should seek and
obtain part-time employment due to the children's needs.
Plaintiff shall have the right to request defendant to obtain a physical
examination by a hand expert currently, with a further examination six
months from the entry of the Decree of Divorce and a second further
examination one year from the entry of the Decree of Divorce to assist the
Court in determining defendant's ability to obtain employment.
(Emphasis added).
3

It should be noted that, had the trial court considered the alternative examined
by the Utah Supreme Court in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) of dividing
the income of the parties to maintain each of them at the same standard of living, a
substantially higher alimony award could have been made. 748 P.2d at 1081.
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she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the [receiving spouse] from
becoming a public charge/'
Tones v. Tones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) quoting English v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 411
(Utah 1977).
The parties presented conflicting testimony over the issue of whether or not
Ms. Gerber could work as a dental hygienist. However, there was no question that she
did not have a license and did not have sufficient tactile ability to allow her to function so
as to obtain the license necessary to practice as a dental hygienist. The issues of
whether or not that tactility could be restored to her or a training program existed which
would allow her eventually receive a license could not be resolved. As Judge Cornaby
declared in his ruling of June 16, 1995 on Dr. Gerber's Motion for a New Trial:
The plaintiff wants the defendant to work full time and earn $4,000.00 per
month as a dental hygienist. Presumably, if she did earn $4,000.00, he
would not have to pay alimony....
A new trial could not prove that the Defendant has the tactile ability to be
a dental hygienist. It could not prove that the Defendant would qualify for
admission to Weber's Dental Hygiene School, that a special program would
in fact be designed, that after completing the program the Defendant would
have the tactile ability to function as a dental hygienist, and that the
Defendant would in fact be certified.
The Court at trial concluded that the Defendant should be able to earn
more than her current monthly income of $300.00 per month. The Court
gave her until December, 1995, to increase her income by $500 per month,
and until December, 1996, to increase her income by another $500 per
month. The Court knew this would be full time work and would not be in the
children's best interest. The Plaintiff, however, insisted upon it. (Record 148149).
Judge Cornaby's findings of fact reveal that he considered all of the factors
mandated by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court in making his alimony
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determination. He m a d e an award that requires Ms. Gerber to gradually increase her
earnings. As he said, unfortunately, this will cause her to have less time to spend with the
children. Judge Cornaby m a d e clear that he ordered the reduction only b e c a u s e Dr.
Gerber demanded it and not because of any change in the parties' circumstances. The
court did note that his decision was made in part because of the relatively large amount
of assets that e a c h party controlled and would have controlled had they remained
married. Despite obtaining his goal, Dr. Gerber pursues an appeal to this Court to try to
take away the $3,000.00 which Judge Cornaby, on a long-term basis, awarded to Ms.
Gerber.
Dr. Gerber's income was $16,666.67 per month and while there was evidence that
he may have changed his tax withholdings (Record 282-287), his gross income remained
the same a s that at the time of the Decree. His living expenses remained basically the
same. (Exhibits 2, 9 and 10). His testimony also revealed that he knew what his mortgage
and basic living expenses would be when he entered into the parties 7 agreement to settle
the matter on June 23, 1993 (Record 289). He also acknowledged on cross examination
that he m a d e claims for living expenses on Exhibit 2 which he was not in fact paying
(Record 339). The trial court's findings reflect the evidence presented that Dr. Gerber's
ability to pay alimony has not significantly changed since the parties' agreement.
Ms. Gerber testified that her needs were basically the s a m e a s at the time the
parties' stipulated the alimony amount. She testified that she still was in need of the
$4,000.00 in alimony and $2,100.00 in child support to support herself and the children in
the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage (Record 393). Again, the trial court did
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not err in finding that Ms. Gerber needed additional money to live in the lifestyle the
parties' enjoyed during their marriage.
Dr. Gerber currently earns $16,666.67 per month. Even if Ms. Gerber could earn
$4,000.00 per month, Dr. Gerber would ask this Court to say that he is entitled to all
$16,666.67 and that Ms. Gerber is entitled to nothing. If she could earn $4,000.00 and he
were paying $3,000.00, she would then have a gross income of $7,000.00 per month. He
would have $13,666.67 per month. The trial court appropriately entered an order after
considering all of the mandated factors. That order should be affirmed.
POINT in
NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE
HAS OCCURRED JUSTIFYING THE
TERMINATION OF MS. GERBER'S ALIMONY
Dr. Gerber asserts that the trial court erred in not terminating Ms. Gerber's
alimony. He asserts that the trial court erred in not finding that Ms. Gerber could be
earning $4,000.00 per month and thus replace the $4,000.00 Dr. Gerber is currently
paying. Dr. Gerber asks this Court to hold the trial court erred in finding that Ms.
Gerber's testimony regarding having insufficient tactile ability to function as a dental
hygienist was credible. As Judge Cornaby said in ruling on Dr. Gerber's Motion for a New
Trial:
A new trial could not prove that Defendant has the tactile ability to be a
dental hygienist. It could not prove that the Defendant would qualify for
admission to Weber's Dental Hygiene School, that a special program would
in fact be designed, that after completing the program, the Defendant
would have the tactile ability to function as a dental hygienist, and that the
Defendant would in fact be certified.
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Ms. Gerber did obtain part-time employment as a substitute school teacher. Her
earnings were gradually increasing. To reflect that fact, Judge Cornaby ruled that the
alimony paid by Dr. Gerber would decrease by $500.00 per month in one year, that is, on
December 1, 1995, and an additional $500.00 per month on December 1, 1996. Despite
the fact that Judge Cornaby thus has forced Ms. Gerber, at Dr. Gerber's insistence, to
either suffer a decline in her living standards or c e a s e providing extensive care and
support for the parties' children (though he could clearly afford to make these payments
a n d chooses not to), he pursues an appeal to this Court, asserting that there h a s been
a significant c h a n g e of circumstances that justify a termination, not a reduction, in the
alimony award. The trial court appropriately rejected this assertion.
This Court recently addressed a similar issue in Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038
(Utah App. 1994). There, the Court noted that in order to modify an alimony award, the
petitioner must demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. Id^ at 1040. The
Court noted that a threefold increase in a spouse's earnings was a "change", "but that
plaintiff 'has not shown a substantial change in circumstances,' presumably because she
was employed at the time of the hearing." Id, at 1040, n. 5. Here, Ms. Gerber was
unemployed at the time of the Decree. Her obtaining employment was a change in
circumstances, but not a substantial change warranting modification of the alimony
amount.
Dr. Gerber receives $10,566.00 of his earnings each month while Ms. Gerber and
the parties' children receive $6,100.00 of his earnings. Ms. Gerber was able to earn an
additional $300.00 per month substitute teaching, though she believed that amount would
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rise as she did more. The parties envisioned that she would return to work. She did.
Judge Cornaby's ruling, carried to its full effect, means that by the time this Court hears
this case, Dr. Gerber will receive $11,566.00 of his earnings each month while Ms. Gerber
and the parties' children receive $5,100.00 of his earnings and presumably $1,300.00 of
her earnings. When the children are emancipated, assuming no further changes, Ms.
Gerber will have $3,000.00 per month of Dr. Gerber's earnings. He will have $13,667.00
of his earnings each month.
Ms. Gerber, at this point, cannot be a dental hygienist. But even if she were able
to do so and earn the $4,000.00 per month which Dr. Gerber asserts she should earn, she
would then have income of $7,000.00 per month versus his $13,667.00 per month. In
establishing alimony, the court is to try to maintain parties as nearly as possible and the
living standard that they enjoyed during their marriage. Tones, supra, Gardner, supra.
Clearly, Dr. Gerber vill enjoy a higher living standard than Ms. Gerber under these
circumstances and urder the more probable set of circumstances, he will have income
of no less than $13,667.00 per month while she will have income of $4,300.00 per month.
As this Court ruled in Moore v. Moore. 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah App. 1994), where it was
anticipated that wife would return to work, that employment and the income that resulted
from it would not be considered a substantial change in circumstances justifying a
modification of the Decree of Divorce. This Court should likewise affirm the trial court's
finding that has not been a change in circumstances which would justify a drastic
reduction or termination of alimony.
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CONCLUSION
This appeal is clearly a frivolous appeal by Dr. Gerber who is carrying out the
threat he m a d e to Ms. Gerber on April 20, 1995 to involve her in legal proceedings until
he had forced her to use all of the money that was awarded to her in the Decree for legal
fees. Not only has he failed to marshall the evidence that supported the trial judge's
factual findings, he completely ignored one of the two b a s e s on which the ruling of the
trial court was made, that is, the ability and desire of Ms. Gerber to function a s a mother
in supporting the children in school, social, sport and religious activities. The findings
of the trial court clearly support the alimony award m a d e and there is no substantial
c h a n g e in circumstances justifying re-examination of the Decree.
This a p p e a l is a frivolous appeal. It should be treated accordingly. Allred v.
Allred. 807 P.2d 350 (Utah App. 1991); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings and order and impose all
permitted sanctions.
REQUEST FOR FEES ON APPEAL
Just a s Judge Cornaby awarded Ms. Gerber fees for having to fight the Motion for
a New Trial and to resist Dr. Gerber's challenge to the Findings of Facts and Conclusions
of Law a s well a s the Order implementing the judge's decision (Record, 149, 178, 187-188),
this Court should, in addition to the sanctions for frivolous appeal, award Ms. Gerber the
attorney's fees that she has incurred in responding to the appeal.

22
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Respectfully submitted,

David S. Dolowitz
Ralph E. Chamness
Attorneys for Appellee Ms. Gerber
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